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Leaning Out:  How Negative Recruitment Experiences Shape Women’s Decisions to 
Compete for Executive Roles 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes gender differences in responses to recruitment rejections as a previously 
unexamined mechanism contributing to women’s under-representation in top management. 
We show that women are less likely than men to consider another job with a prospective 
employer that has rejected them in the past. We build a theoretical model whereby, because 
of women’s minority status in senior roles, recruitment rejection triggers uncertainty about 
their general belonging in the executive domain. Belonging uncertainty, in turn, both leads 
women to place greater weight than men on fair treatment and negatively affects their 
perceptions of the fairness of the treatment they receive. This dual process makes women 
more disinclined than men to apply again to a previously rejecting firm. We test our theory 
with three studies: A field study using longitudinal archival data from an executive search 
firm, a survey of executives, and an experiment using executive respondents.  The results, 
which are consistent with our model, have implications for theory and practice regarding 
gender inequality at the labor market’s upper echelons. In particular, we highlight that 
women’s supply-side decisions to “lean out” of competition for senior roles must be 
understood in light of their previous experiences with demand-side employers’ practices.  
  
3 
Despite organizational and legislative safeguards and a lively debate over the business case 
for gender diversity in top management teams (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Post and 
Byron, 2015), women remain under-represented at the top echelons of organizations. Women 
hold about 16% of senior executive roles in Fortune 500 companies and only 5% of CEO 
positions (2020 Women on Boards, 2014). One set of explanations for this under-
representation is based on the different career choices made by men and women, which result 
in a limited pipeline of women who are both available and willing to fill senior management 
jobs (e.g., Parrotta and Smith, 2013). Popular interpretations of this pipeline problem place 
the spotlight on the women themselves and their ambitions, encouraging them to “lean in” to 
leadership roles (Sandberg, 2013). An underlying argument in many of these accounts is that 
women in general have a distaste for performing in the competitive environments typical of 
executive-level roles and so avoid striving for those jobs altogether (Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007; Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Flory, et al., 2014). Yet even though laboratory 
experiments have found gender differences in the willingness to compete, there is not much 
research establishing the relevance of these differences for labor market outcomes (Bertrand, 
2011; Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler, 2015). Most evidence in this field concerns women’s 
choices of college majors before even starting their careers (Correll, 2001; Buser, et al., 
2012), and only a handful of studies examine women’s actual job application choices 
(Barbulescu and Bidwell, 2013; Flory, et al., 2014). 
Beyond the lack of direct evidence, another problem with extant accounts of women’s 
reluctance to strive for senior roles is that the decisions to compete (or not) for these jobs are 
usually treated as being independent of women’s actual experiences in executive selection 
systems. There is, after all, substantial evidence that female under-representation in top 
management is due not only to women’s choices but also to employers’ practices – that is, to 
the demand side of the labor market (Reskin and Roos, 1990; Haveman and Beresford, 2012). 
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Laboratory studies have pointed to unconscious bias and stereotyping as drivers of 
employers’ preferences for male candidates during screening and evaluation processes (Eagly 
and Karau, 2002). At the same time, considerable field research establishes that women face 
promotion barriers within organizations (Cohen, et al., 1998; Barnett, et al., 2000) and are 
often disadvantaged in external hiring processes (Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Fernandez-
Mateo and King, 2011; Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014). Most authors who study women’s 
career choices acknowledge that these choices are not entirely driven by intrinsic preferences 
(Goldsmith, et al., 2004; Bertrand, 2011; Barbulescu and Bidwell, 2013; Sutter and Glätzle-
Rützler, 2015); however, we have little knowledge of how women’s past experiences with 
gender inequality in recruitment and selection may influence their tendency to “lean out” of 
competing for top management jobs. 
That is the issue we address here. We situate our research in the context of repeat 
interactions between recruiters and individuals, focusing on gender differences in individuals’ 
willingness to consider another role with a firm by which they were previously rejected. We 
claim that direct and vicarious experiences with gender inequality in executive realms may 
differentially shape the effect of recruitment rejections for men and women. In particular, we 
suggest that because of women’s “outsider” status in executive labor markets, rejection 
triggers uncertainty about the extent to which they belong in executive domains (cf. Walton, 
and Cohen, 2007). As a consequence of this belonging uncertainty, women place more 
emphasis on fair treatment in the selection process (the greater-weighting effect) and 
perceive treatment to be less fair (the confirmation effect) when they are rejected. Both 
effects influence their decision-making when they consider whether to put themselves 
forward for a role with a previously rejecting firm. Our model thus integrates research on 
motivational theories of procedural justice (Tyler and Blader, 2003) with work on belonging 
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uncertainty (Walton and Cohen, 2007) to propose that women pursuing executive roles are 
less likely than men to consider an opportunity with a firm that has rejected them in the past.  
By highlighting men’s and women’s differing responses to recruitment rejections, we 
identify a novel phenomenon that may contribute to women’s under-representation in senior 
executive roles. In order to reach an organization’s highest echelons, individuals must win a 
series of competitions – both within and across firms – for jobs (Rosenbaum, 1979). Each of 
these competitions carries the risk of being rejected for the role, since there is seldom more 
than one person selected among those who are considered. Thus individuals competing for an 
executive job will likely have accumulated multiple recruitment rejections, often by the same 
firm that is considering them for another position.1 Given the sequential nature of executive 
selection processes, rejection-driven differences in willingness to compete in a given round 
would affect the proportion of available women in subsequent selection rounds, contributing 
to a cumulative gender disadvantage and thus possibly increasing gender inequality over time 
(DiPrete and Eirich, 2006). 
We test our theoretical arguments using a combination of field, survey, and 
experimental data from three separate studies that we shall describe in detail. This paper 
makes a threefold contribution to the literature. First, by identifying the previously 
unexplored role of recruitment rejections, we contribute to theories of gender differences in 
career trajectories (Rosenfeld, 1980; Barnett, et al., 2000; Ridgeway, 2011); those theories 
have yet to examine the possibility that recruitment interactions not resulting in job 
placement may have consequences for gender inequality. Second, we provide a theoretical 
link between two major streams of research on gender inequality that have heretofore been 
                                                 
1 Statistics on the prevalence of repeat interactions between candidates and firms are unavailable because 
researchers usually have neither access to the job candidate pools nor information (over time) on who rejected 
whom. A few hiring studies note that as many as a quarter of job applications are from applicants who had 
previously been rejected by the firm (Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo, 2006; Fernandez and Mors, 2008). This 
phenomenon is likely to be even more common in the context of internal recruitment processes (e.g., 
competitions for promotions). 
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mostly independent: studies focusing on employers’ actions (the demand side) and studies 
focusing on workers’ choices (the supply side). We connect these streams by explicitly 
modeling women’s decisions to compete for jobs as being influenced, in part, by their past 
experiences with employers’ practices – rather than by intrinsic preferences alone. In 
particular, we highlight that women’s experiences as members of a negatively stereotyped 
minority in the executive domain both shape their sense of belonging in top management and 
their reactions to firms’ recruitment practices. Finally, we contribute to a nascent stream of 
research on procedural justice in selection and recruitment that examines the internal 
processes underlying fairness judgements (Brockner, et al., 2015). Our evidence that rejection 
triggers belonging uncertainty and shapes perceptions of procedural justice for women but 
not men allows us to identify a psychological mechanism driving gendered perceptual 
differences in the operation of theories of justice. These three theoretical contributions have 
significant implications for organizations and organizational policy. 
Responses to Rejection in Executive Recruitment 
Rejection is an undesirable experience because it represents a threat to the fundamental 
human goals of value and acceptance (Richman and Leary, 2009). Individuals who are 
rejected may withdraw entirely from future interactions with the person who rejects them 
(Vangelisti, 2001), especially if they feel that they have been treated unfairly (Richman and 
Leary, 2009). The importance of fair treatment extends beyond the interpersonal realm to 
interactions between individuals and organizations, particularly in the domain of selection 
and recruitment where rejections frequently occur (Gilliland, 1994; Hausknecht, et al., 2004). 
Individuals care a great deal about the perceived fairness of the procedures used to arrive at a 
selection decision – that is, procedural justice (Folger and Greenberg, 1985). The dominant 
theoretical perspective on procedural justice and applicant reactions is social justice theory, 
which suggests that candidates expect hiring organizations to observe procedural justice rules 
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and that, when those rules are perceived to have been violated, candidates tend to react 
negatively (Gilliland, 1994). Hence much research has examined the objective features of 
selection processes that affect applicants’ perceptions of procedural justice. Factors such as 
whether selection procedures are applied consistently, whether hiring criteria are related to 
the focal job and/or predictive of future job performance, and whether individuals are given 
adequate feedback are highly predictive of how procedural justice is perceived (Hausknecht, 
et al., 2004). In turn, perceptions of procedural justice have been linked empirically to 
organizational attractiveness, recommendation intentions, and acceptance intentions 
(Gilliland, 1994; Hausknecht, et al., 2004) and have been linked theoretically (but not yet 
empirically) to candidates’ willingness to apply for a position at a previously rejecting 
organization (Hausknecht, et al., 2004). 
Whereas research in selection and recruitment has focused on how individuals arrive 
at perceptions of procedural justice, another line of work in the literature on groups has 
examined why individuals care about procedural justice at all. People are generally more 
concerned about fair treatment (i.e., procedural justice) than about fair outcomes (i.e., 
distributive justice). Indeed, research suggests that individuals are less concerned about 
whether a decision favors them when they view the decision-making procedures as fair (Lind 
and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Blader, 2003). According to motivational theories of procedural 
justice, fair treatment is important because the procedures used to make decisions 
communicate identity-relevant information (Tyler and Blader, 2003; De Cremer and Tyler, 
2005). In particular, fair treatment sends symbolic messages to individuals, communicating 
that they are valued and belong within the particular group where the treatment occurs (De 
Cremer and Tyler, 2005). Fair treatment, in turn, affects individuals’ behavior within the 
group, motivating them to cooperate and engage (De Cremer and Tyler, 2005). 
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Individuals’ judgments about the fairness of the selection procedures used to reject 
them are therefore likely to inform both their assessment of the hiring organization as well as 
their perception of whether they belong in that organization, in the profession, or in any other 
social identity group relevant to the selection process. Although all individuals care about 
belonging and are as such likely to care about procedural justice, perceptions of fair treatment 
are likely to be more relevant for individuals who are members of social identity groups that 
are negatively stereotyped in an academic or professional domain. We next build on these 
ideas to develop a theoretical understanding of gender differences in responses to recruitment 
rejections.  
Belonging Uncertainty and Perceptions of Procedural Justice 
When deciding whether to enter a professional or academic domain, individuals often ask 
themselves “Do I belong?” (Walton and Cohen, 2007). Their answer partly depends on their 
assessment of whether “people like them” are seen as legitimate members of that domain. 
Individuals  who are members of negatively stereotyped groups in a domain frequently 
experience latent belonging uncertainty – a global uncertainty about whether they will be 
accepted or rejected in that context (Cohen and Garcia, 2008). When belonging uncertainty is 
high, members of negatively stereotyped groups may opt out of the domain; even if their 
performance is high (Good, et al., 2012) and even if they do not necessarily fear that they 
themselves will be stereotyped (Walton and Cohen, 2007).2  
                                                 
2 The construct of belonging uncertainty is closely related to (but different from) stereotype threat. Stereotype 
threat is defined as the fear of confirming a negative stereotype about one’s group, and it has been shown to 
undermine the performance of stereotyped individuals – e.g. women in math (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2006). 
Belonging uncertainty also arises from negative stereotypes about one’s group and, as such, it includes an 
element of stereotype threat. However, belonging uncertainty is a more general term, which can manifest with or 
without the evaluative tests that trigger stereotype threat (Walton and Cohen, 2007). In other words, while 
stereotype threat primarily operates through individuals’ self-efficacy, belonging uncertainty also includes social 
concerns. According to Good et al. (2012), traditional stereotype threat primarily accounts for 
underperformance; belonging uncertainty accounts for under-participation.   
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 We argue that women’s behavior in competitions for top management roles is 
similarly shaped by concerns about their belonging to the executive domain. Women are not 
only dramatically under-represented in executive jobs (2020 Women on Boards, 2014), but 
they often encounter negative stereotypes about their leadership abilities in these positions. In 
particular, women are seen as a poor fit for organizational leadership roles, given that the 
qualities stereotypically associated with femininity are viewed as being irrelevant to or even 
incompatible with the qualities desired of leaders (Eagly, 2007). The perceived mismatch 
between being a woman and being a leader is more acute at the executive level, where 
employers often define the ideal candidate in explicitly masculine terms (Acker, 1990; 
Meriläinen, et al., 2013). These negative stereotypes are consistent with the observed unequal 
distribution, representation, and treatment of women in executive positions. For example, 
women are less likely to be considered for executive roles than men (Dreher, et al., 2011). 
Women who do succeed at attaining an executive-level role are more likely to be appointed 
(than are men) to positions where the risk of failure is high (Ryan, et al., 2011); and female 
executives are often paid less than their male peers (Carter, et al., 2014). Women pursuing 
executive roles are more than likely to have had direct or vicarious experiences with this 
unequal gender treatment over the course of their career, and these experiences will 
necessarily affect their answer to the question “Do people like me belong here?” 
 In particular, women executives’ direct and vicarious experiences with negative 
gender stereotyping are likely to underlie a latent sense of belonging uncertainty to the 
executive domain. As a consequence, threats to belonging are likely to trigger this latent 
uncertainty in women. Indeed, prior research suggests that belonging uncertainty is 
accentuated for negatively-stereotyped individuals who experience rejection, especially if 
there is a possibility that the rejection could be based on their social identity, with negative 
consequences for their perception of the interactions they have in those contexts (Cohen and 
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Garcia, 2008) and their willingness to persist in the domain where their belonging is in 
question (Good, et al., 2012). We build on this prior work to propose that gender differences 
in belonging uncertainty in executive domains will differentially shape men’s and women’s 
perceptions of the recruitment procedures and their responses to recruitment rejections. 
Although all individuals are reluctant to engage with a firm that has rejected them in the past 
- particularly if they believe that the process was unfair (Fernandez-Mateo and Coh, 2015), 
we argue that women who are rejected for an executive position will be less inclined than 
men to apply for another position at the rejecting firm. We formalize this baseline hypothesis 
as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Women are less willing than men to consider a job opportunity from a 
firm that has rejected them in the past. 
Building on motivational theories of procedural justice (Tyler and Blader, 2003) and 
belonging uncertainty research (Walton and Cohen, 2007), we propose that two 
psychological mechanisms are associated with this hypothesized gender difference, both of 
which focus on the interplay between women’s increased belonging uncertainty after 
experiencing a recruitment rejection and their perceptions of procedural justice. Specifically, 
we suggest that, to the extent that women experience belonging uncertainty after a rejection, 
they (1) assign more weight to unfair treatment (the greater-weighting effect) and (2) 
perceive less fair treatment in the selection process (the confirmation effect). Key to this 
dual-process model is the idea that belonging uncertainty is at the same time a question (“Do 
I belong here?”) and a belief (“I do not belong here”) (Walton and Cohen, 2007), and thus 
has the power to both shape individuals’ appraisal of information that provides cues about 
their belonging, as well as influence their interpretation of this information so as to confirm 
their beliefs about their lack of belonging. We elaborate on each of these processes below. 
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The greater-weighting effect. There are many reasons why individuals are rejected for 
executive roles, from skill gaps to lack of cultural fit or personality clashes (Khurana, 2002). 
For members of groups that are negatively stereotyped in the executive labor market, there is 
also the (generally unstated) possibility that the rejection was somehow based on their social 
identity. Thus, women who are rejected for an executive role may suspect that they were 
rejected on the basis of their gender (as may or may not have been the case). This suspicion, 
based on women’s direct and vicarious labor market experiences with unequal treatment on 
the basis of their gender, triggers uncertainty about the extent to which they belong in 
executive realms. When belonging uncertainty is heightened, individuals pay particular 
attention to any cue that may inform their concerns, by signaling their acceptance or 
exclusion within the domain where their belonging uncertainty arises (Cohen and Garcia, 
2008).  
Given its symbolic value in terms of communicating belonging, procedural justice is 
likely to be a key indicator that women attend to when questions about their value and fit 
arise in executive domains. Although all individuals care about and pay attention to how 
fairly they are treated in recruitment contexts (Gilliland, 1994) some authors have suggested 
that procedural justice attracts more attention and has stronger behavioral consequences for 
individuals who are uncertain about their belonging (De Cremer and Tyler, 2005). As such, 
we suggest that women who are rejected by an organization are likely to pay more attention 
to the treatment they receive in the selection process than men and, as a consequence of this 
heightened salience, are likely to weigh procedural justice more heavily when deciding 
whether to re-apply to the firm. Thus, although all executive candidates are less likely to re-
apply if they believe they have been treated unfairly by a firm that has rejected them in the 
past (and vice versa, Hausknecht, et al., 2004), we propose that this tendency will be more 
evident in women than men. Accordingly, we propose:  
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Hypothesis 2: Perceived  procedural justice will be more strongly associated with 
women’s than with men’s willingness to consider a job opportunity from a firm that has 
rejected them in the past. 
The confirmation effect. Whereas the greater-weighting effect suggests that women’s 
belonging uncertainty will lead them to  place more emphasis on fair treatment than men, the 
confirmation effect suggests that it will differentially shape women’s and men’s perceptions 
of whether or not they were treated fairly to begin with. The confirmation effect stems from 
the fact that belonging uncertainty is an implicit hypothesis that members of negatively 
stereotyped groups hold about their lack of belonging in certain domains, which consequently 
shapes their interpretation of events and experiences that take place within those realms. In 
other words, the same objective event may be perceived differently by different groups 
(Walton and Cohen, 2007). In particular, negatively-stereotyped individuals’ beliefs about 
their lack of belonging are subject to confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), such that 
information consistent with the hypothesis “I do not belong here” is more likely to be 
searched for, noticed and accepted than information that is inconsistent with this hypothesis 
(Walton and Cohen, 2007). In the context of executive recruitment, this implies that when 
women’s belonging uncertainty is triggered by a rejection they are likely to notice and 
remember treatment that confirms their lack of belonging, to interpret ambiguous treatment 
as confirming their lack of belonging (rather than as a neutral or positive signal), and to be 
skeptical of treatment that seems to confirm their belonging. We therefore postulate that 
recruitment rejection will trigger belonging uncertainty in women, negatively affecting their 
perceptions of procedural justice. Negative perceptions of procedural justice will in turn 
mean that women are disinclined to apply to firms that have rejected them in the past. In 
contrast, because male applicants have little reason to suppose that they were rejected 
because of their gender (since men are typically positively stereotyped and over-represented 
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in executive domains), they are not primed to make belonging-related negative evaluations of 
their treatment in recruitment settings. We formalize this argument as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Recruitment rejection triggers belonging uncertainty in women, 
negatively affecting their perceived procedural justice and in turn, their willingness to 
consider a job opportunity from a firm that has rejected them in the past.  
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
We test our hypotheses in three studies using field, survey, and experimental data to examine 
men’s and women’s willingness to be considered for a job by an organization that has 
rejected them in the past. We define rejection as occurring when an individual does not 
succeed in attaining the applied-for position and we shall therefore examine gender 
differences in the responses to rejections occurring throughout the executive selection 
process. Table 1 presents a summary of the data used in the three studies. In Study 1 we use 
longitudinal field data to test our core proposition that women are less likely than men to 
consider a job opportunity from a firm that has rejected them in the past. The data were 
obtained from the archives of an executive search firm, and they include all its interactions 
with 10,292 candidates considered for senior management jobs over a five-year period. In 
Study 2 we seek to replicate our core proposition in a broader sample – via a survey of men 
and women executives – and examine the greater-weighting of perceived procedural justice 
in women’s responses to rejection, relative to men. The final study is an experiment in which 
we test the confirmation effect, by randomly assigning participants to adopt the perspective of 
a candidate who was rejected or accepted after applying for an executive role and examining 
the consequences of rejection on men’s and women’s belonging uncertainty, perceived 
procedural justice and subsequent willingness to apply for another role with the rejecting 
employer. 
[[ INSERT Table 1 about Here ]] 
14 
 
STUDY 1: LONGITUDINAL FIELD DATA FROM AN EXECUTIVE SEARCH FIRM 
The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate, in a field setting, whether men and women differ 
in their responses to being rejected in executive selection processes. We posit that men’s and 
women’s responses are affected by their prior interactions with employers. In order to test 
this theory, we must observe candidates – some of whom are rejected – competing for various 
jobs over time. Obtaining data of this type is a challenge because most organizations do not 
keep good records of previously rejected individuals. However, executive search firms 
maintain detailed archives of their interactions with candidates and thus enable what is 
practically the only means of testing our theory against longitudinal real-world data. 
Although search firms aim to fill jobs for their clients, not for themselves, research on this 
sector documents that search firms keep tight control of the entire recruitment process and 
also limit the amount of direct interaction between client and candidate even during later 
stages of the process (Finlay and Coverdill, 2002; Cappelli and Hamori, 2013). In particular, 
it is nearly always the search firm’s (not its client’s) job to inform the candidate of rejection 
outcomes. Candidates’ rejection experiences are thus shaped by their interactions with the 
search firm and, according to our theory, should affect their willingness to engage with the 
same search firm or (by proxy) its clients in the future. 
Setting and Data 
We use data from the records of a UK-based executive search firm that we refer to as 
“Execo” (not its real name). The jobs for which Execo recruits are highly paid, with an 
average wage of GBP160,000 - within the top 1% of the UK salary distribution. We obtained 
information on all the candidates whom this search firm considered for jobs between 2005 
and 2009. The selection process begins when a client firm asks Execo to fill a job vacancy, at 
which time search consultants assemble a ‘long’ list (of about 60 potential candidates) by 
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searching their database and asking their contacts for leads. Most of these candidates are 
initially unaware that they are being considered – unless the job is an advertised one to which 
they have applied. Once this consideration set is assembled, search consultants evaluate the 
candidates more closely and decide whom to phone for a possible interview. The ensuing 
phone conversation can lead to one of three outcomes: the candidate decides not to participate 
in a formal interview (“candidate declines to interview”); the consultant decides that the 
candidate is not suitable for the role (“search firm rejects candidate”); or the candidate 
interviews with the search firm.3 These categories are mutually exclusive in the data set. 
After a candidate is interviewed by the search firm, again there are three possible (and 
mutually exclusive) outcomes: the search firm decides not to have the candidate interview 
with the client; the candidate declines an offered interview with the client; or the candidate 
interviews with the client. The client is not involved in the process until presented with a 
short list of candidates to interview. After interviewing with the client, the candidate may or 
may not be offered the job; if offered, the candidate must then decide whether or not to 
accept it. Our outcome of interest is the candidate’s decision at the very first stage of the 
process – that is, whether the candidate agrees to proceed to a formal interview with the 
search firm. We focus on this outcome for two reasons. First, it is the nearest equivalent to 
applying for a job, which is our theoretical construct of interest. Second, at the start of a 
hiring process the interaction is limited to candidate and search firm; there is no client 
involvement. In fact, candidates who are approached for an interview are seldom given any 
information about the client firm. This procedure ensures that candidates’ decisions to 
                                                 
3 We do not have information on which candidates were contacted by Execo. If the candidate was interviewed or 
refused to interview then we do know that they were contacted and hence were aware of being considered. 
However, some candidates whom the search firm rejects at this stage may not have been contacted by a 
consultant and so are unaware of the rejection. Because we cannot identify when this occurred, all instances in 
which the search firm rejects a candidate are treated equally at this stage. This approach renders the data noisier 
to the extent that candidates do not perceive their (unknown) rejection as such. Therefore, our empirical test is 
likely to be conservative because noise in the independent variable can only make it more difficult to identify 
the effect of past rejections. 
16 
interview are not affected by client identity or behavior but only by past interactions between 
candidate and search firm. 
The data set is a panel of individuals who are considered for multiple jobs over time. 
So each time a candidate is considered for a job, we know whether she had previously been 
rejected (at any stage of the recruitment process) for other roles presented to her by the search 
firm. Our goal is to identify gender differences in the effect of these past rejections on the 
candidate’s decision to be considered for the current job. Yet there are several reasons why 
this is not a trivial identification task. First, the willingness (or lack thereof) to be considered 
for a job is likely driven at least in part by individual characteristics that may be correlated 
with candidates’ past rejections. For example, one may expect that lower-quality candidates 
are both more likely to have been rejected in the past and more willing to be considered for 
future jobs. We isolate the effect of rejection from such idiosyncratic factors by employing an 
estimation that incorporates candidate fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in 
stable individual characteristics. In essence, this approach compares a given candidate with 
herself over time and under different “rejection regimes” – that is, when she has versus has 
not been rejected in the past. 
An approach based on individual fixed effects requires at least two observations per 
candidate, a requirement that has two implications for our analysis. First, the main effect of 
gender on rejection is not estimated because it does not vary by candidate. Second, the 
models do not predict the probability that a given candidate will be considered for a job after 
a rejection, but rather the probability that, if they are considered again, the candidate will 
reject that opportunity. We have complete data on 23,555 observations, which correspond to 
10,292 candidates who were considered for at least two jobs by Execo between 2005 and 
2009. Our unit of analysis is the candidate–job pair. 
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Measures 
Outcome variable. The outcome variable is Candidate declined to interview with the 
search firm (for the focal job). This dummy variable is set equal to 1 if the candidate declines 
an interview with Execo; it is set equal to 0 if the candidate does not decline an interview – in 
other words, if the candidate either is formally interviewed or is rejected by Execo prior to 
the interview stage. Note that this variable measures the lack of willingness to consider an 
opportunity, which is therefore reverse coded with respect to our theoretical hypothesis. The 
reason is that these data cannot support a “candidate willing to be interviewed” measure that 
is independent of the search firm’s own decision to interview the candidate. In contrast, 
declining an interview is clearly the candidate’s decision, which is the theoretical outcome we 
care about.4 
Predictor variable. The predictor variable is an interaction effect between two 
dichotomous indicators: Candidate was previously rejected and Female candidate (1 = 
female, 0 = male). The former dummy variable is set equal to 1 if the focal candidate was 
ever rejected in a previous job consideration at any stage of the hiring process (and is set to 0 
otherwise).5 Although our data set includes only those jobs that Execo attempted to fill 
between 2005 and 2009, it includes information on candidates’ interactions with Execo from 
2001 onward. So if a candidate was considered for a position before 2005, we know whether 
the search ended up in rejection even when we know nothing else about that job. We use a 
                                                 
4 To see why Candidate agreed to interview would make for a problematic dependent variable, imagine that 
previously rejected candidates are in fact less likely to be interviewed. In this case we would be unable to tell 
whether that trend resulted from the search firm being less willing to interview such candidates or from the 
reduced willingness of those candidates to be interviewed. Yet if we observe that previously rejected candidates 
decline to interview for the focal job, then it can be only their decision to pass on the opportunity. 
5 Candidates may have been rejected at any stage of the hiring process in the past (before interviewing with the 
search firm, after interviewing with the search firm, or after interviewing with the client).This measure 
aggregates all past rejections into a single indicator, and we use it for three reasons. First, we do not theorize 
about the effects of rejections at different stages. Second, as already mentioned, the search firm’s heavy 
involvement in the process suggests that rejected candidates will attribute some of that rejection to the search 
firm – even if they were rejected at later stages of the process. Finally, the analysis becomes much more 
complicated once we splice rejections into different categories (for details, see the Results subsection to follow). 
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dichotomous measure of past rejections because the average number of jobs for which 
candidates have been rejected is small; we therefore expect that rejection effects arise from 
experiencing any rejection, not just a high number of them. Nonetheless, in separate results 
we confirmed that our findings are not substantively altered when we instead use a 
continuous measure of past rejections. 
Control variables. The probability of a candidate declining to interview may be 
affected by her own past history of rejecting Execo, so we controlled for whether the 
Candidate declined past opportunity from the search firm. We also controlled for Candidate 
was previously placed by Execo (1 = yes, 0 = no) and the number of jobs for which Execo 
previously considered the candidate (our Candidate jobs considered by Execo count 
variable). Candidates may have other interactions with Execo; for instance, search 
consultants sometimes call once and future candidates to chat about the industry, ask for 
referrals, and so forth. We controlled for the number of such interactions (by way of our 
Candidate contacts in other roles variable) to account for the possible transmission of 
information between Execo and candidates when the latter are not being evaluated for jobs. 
The final control on this side was whether Candidate answered advertisement for the focal 
job (1 = candidate applied, 0 = candidate did not apply). 
In addition, the analysis included a number of controls about the focal job itself. We 
controlled for: the (log of the) base Job salary, in British pounds sterling (GBP), that the 
client firm was willing to pay a hired candidate; the Number of candidates considered for the 
focal job (also logged, since this variable is skewed); the number of job searches that Execo 
conducted for the hiring firm between January 2005 and the start date of the focal job (the 
Prior search firm–client relationship variable); and whether or not the Job was advertised 
(1 = yes, 0 = no). We also controlled for Job function and Job industry. We included 
dummies for 18 job functions (plus a dummy for cases where this information is missing): 
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board member, chief executive officer, chief financial officer, consultant, divisional finance 
director, divisional managing director, divisional sales director, financial services 
professional, government, human resources (HR) director, legal and governance, marketing 
director, nonexecutive director, operations director, pharmaceutical scientist, sales director, 
other management position, and “other”. For job industry, we include dummies for 16 
industries (plus a dummy for cases in which this information is missing):  agriculture, 
education, energy, engineering and manufacturing, finance, government, health, information 
technology (IT), infrastructure, leisure, media, nongovernmental organization (NGO), 
pharmaceuticals, professions, retail, and “other”. Finally, we included Year dummies to 
control for such exogenous factors as the economic climate. Table 2 gives descriptive 
statistics for the main variables used in the analysis, and Table 3 reports their correlations. 
[[ INSERT Table 2 about Here ]] 
[[ INSERT Table 3 about Here ]] 
Analysis 
We estimated a linear probability model (LPM), with candidate fixed effects, in which 
Candidate declined to interview was the dependent variable. We chose a linear specification 
rather than a logit model for two reasons. First, linear models yield coefficients that are easier 
to interpret (see Sorenson and Waguespack, 2006 for a similar procedure); second, logit 
models with panel data and individual fixed effects cannot be estimated for candidates who 
exhibit no variation in the dependent variable. This means that candidates who either always 
declined or always agreed to interview would be dropped from the estimation. The effect 
would be a dramatic reduction in the statistical power of our models because the number of 
candidates for which the regression could be estimated would decrease from 10,292 to 2,990. 
Given that women constitute only 16% of the sample, there would then not be enough female 
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observations in the reduced sample to identify – while using a logit model – any gender 
differences in rejection effects.  
The linear probability model has two main drawbacks. First, it imposes heteroskedasticity in 
the errors, a concern that is easily addressed by using robust estimates of the standard errors 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Second, it generates predicted values that may be outside the 0-
1 interval. Yet Wooldridge (2003) argues that such values are not a serious concern when the 
goal is simply to estimate the independent variable’s marginal effect, averaged across the 
distribution. This is precisely our purpose. 
Results 
The main baseline effects are presented in Model 1 of Table 4. As expected, previously 
rejected candidates (of either gender) were more likely to decline a formal interview than 
were non-rejected candidates (β = .158). This effect is net of any individual stable unobserved 
heterogeneity and so is unrelated to candidates’ qualities. 
[[ INSERT Table 4 about Here ]] 
Model 2 of Table 5 presents the test of Hypothesis 1: that women are less willing than 
men to consider a job opportunity if they were rejected in the past. This hypothesis translates 
into female candidates being more likely to decline an interview with the search firm after 
having been rejected, and it is supported by a significant positive coefficient of the interaction 
term (Candidate was previously rejected × Female candidate): β = .077, p = .001. Ceteris 
paribus, men’s probability of declining to interview is 14.6% higher if they have been 
rejected in the past whereas that increase is 22.3% for women (i.e., 7.7% greater than for 
men). In separate analyses we estimated models without candidate fixed effects in order to 
identify a main effect of Female candidate. We found that the Female candidate coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant both in ordinary least-squares (OLS) and random-
effects specifications; that is, women are more likely than men to decline an interview 
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regardless of whether they were rejected in the past (β = .028 in the OLS model; β = .026 in 
the random-effects model). However, these models fail to account for candidates’ qualities 
that could be correlated with the probability of rejection; hence they do not appropriately 
identify the effects of previous rejections. Indeed, a Hausman test strongly rejects the 
hypothesis that the random-effects and fixed-effects estimations are comparable (p < .001). 
We performed a number of additional robustness checks on the main results shown in 
Model 2. First we conducted an analysis with both candidate and job fixed effects (Table 3, 
Model 3). This allows us to examine the possibility that women’s greater likelihood of 
declining an opportunity after having been rejected is due to their being considered for less 
desirable post-rejection jobs, which could account for their unwillingness to consider such 
positions. When both candidate and job fixed effects are included in the analysis, the 
Candidate was previously rejected × Female candidate interaction term remains significant; 
the implication is that, even when individuals are considered for the exact same job, 
previously rejected women are less willing than previously rejected men to put themselves 
forward for the role. Second, we examined whether women were less likely than men to be 
placed by Execo after being rejected. If they were, then the implication would be that women 
are accurately forecasting a low probability of success when considering future roles and 
hence removing themselves from consideration. Yet in separate analyses we found no gender 
difference in the probability that Execo places candidates whom they previously rejected. The 
interaction term Candidate was previously rejected x Female candidate is not statistically 
significant in predicting probability of placement, which indicates that women’s stronger 
reaction to being rejected is not “adaptive” in this setting. 
Third, in separate analyses (available from the authors) we examined whether our 
findings were affected by the stage at which the rejection occurred. We disaggregated the 
Candidate was previously rejected predictor into three dummy variables depending on the 
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stage of the process at which the candidate had been previously rejected (before interviewing 
with Execo, after interviewing with Execo, or after interviewing with client). Although the 
resulting models became more complex and difficult to interpret, we found the same 
substantive pattern of results: women’s reactions to past rejections are, on average, stronger 
than men’s regardless of the stage at which the rejection occurs. Finally, we examined 
whether changing the base category for our dependent variable would affect the results. In the 
analysis reported here, the dependent (indicator) variable takes the value 1 if the candidate 
declines to interview with the search firm and takes the value 0 otherwise – namely, when the 
candidate is either interviewed or rejected for an interview by the search firm. Our motivation 
for this approach is twofold. First, we have no theoretical reason to distinguish between these 
two cases because we are interested only in candidates’ decisions to decline consideration. 
Second, comparing the candidates’ decisions to all other available observations allows us to 
use the full sample when estimating the models. An alternative approach would be to 
compare the Candidate declined to interview outcome with that of the other two categories 
(i.e., Search firm rejected candidate and Candidate agreed to interview) separately. We 
conducted this analysis and obtained the same substantive results in both cases. Our main 
findings are thus robust not only to the use of different statistical models but also to various 
specifications of the independent and dependent variables. 
Discussion of Study 1 
In line with our theoretical model, Study 1 offers evidence that women are less willing than 
men to consider a job opportunity if they were rejected by the firm in the past (Hypothesis 1). 
Although the field data allow us to provide real-world evidence for our theory and show 
meaningful effect sizes, they have two drawbacks. First, despite the results supporting our 
core proposition, we were unable to test the psychological mechanisms proposed in 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, because the archival data do not include information about why 
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candidates decline to interview or about their perceptions of the process. Second, this setting 
is unusual in that the search firm is not the final employer. Previous research suggests that 
interactions with search firms are experienced by candidates in much the same way as with 
other recruitment processes (Khurana, 2002; Cappelli and Hamori, 2013; Fernandez-Mateo 
and Coh, 2015). Even so, we conducted the next study with the aim of testing our theory on a 
broader sample. 
STUDY 2: SURVEY 
In Study 2 we sought to further examine our finding that women are less likely than men to 
put themselves forward for a position offered by a search firm or employer that has rejected 
them in the past (Hypothesis 1). For that purpose we used a diverse sample of executives 
reporting on their interactions in a range of recruitment environments that included search 
firms as well as prospective employers. In addition, we sought to test Hypothesis 2, – namely 
that perceptions of fair treatment will be weighted more heavily by women than men in their 
decisions to reapply to a firm that has rejected them in the past – by surveying men and 
women in executive roles about their subjective experiences of recent recruitment rejections.  
Participants 
The participants were 99 US residents, 54 of whom were female. We paid a survey company 
to recruit 140 individuals who were currently employed full-time, who had a recent 
experience (within the last three years) of being rejected in the labor market, and who earned 
more than $150,000. We excluded 41 individuals who wrote nonsense or gibberish responses 
to the questions about their recent rejection experience (Berinsky, et al., 2012; Goodman, et 
al., 2013; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014).6 Most (82%) of the participants were white; their 
                                                 
6 Individuals undertaking to complete online surveys pay less attention to the materials presented than do 
participants in traditional face-to-face or laboratory settings, which means that data must be checked carefully 
and problematic responses excluded (Goodman et al., 2013). If inattentive respondents are not excluded, then 
statistical power is reduced and the results of statistical tests can become non-significant and can even be 
reversed (Berinsky et al., 2012). Our exclusion rate is higher than if workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
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average age was 45.32 years with a standard deviation (SD) of 10.01, and they had worked 
on average for 21.73 years (SD = 10.46). 
Procedure 
After checking that respondents met our criteria for inclusion, we asked them to describe 
their most recent experience of being rejected for a role that met the following criteria: 
(1) they were not offered the job; (2) they wanted the job; and (3) they advanced further than 
the application stage and had some contact with the prospective employer. These criteria 
ensured that individuals were reflecting on experiences in which rejection was personally 
meaningful. After writing about their rejection experience, respondents were asked a number 
of other questions about the incident, about the likelihood of their applying again to the same 
employer, and about their perceptions of fair (or unfair) treatment. The respondents 
subsequently completed several questionnaire measures designed to capture, inter alia, career 
orientation and demographic particulars. 
Outcome variable. The outcome variable was respondents’ Willingness to apply 
again to a prospective employer that had rejected them in the past. Respondents were asked 
to “Imagine that tomorrow the company you wrote about approaches you about another role 
that is appropriate for your current career stage. They ask you to apply for this role. Will 
you?” Replies were on a scale ranging from 1 (definitely will not) to 5 (definitely will). 
Predictor variable. The predictor variable was the gender of the respondent, coded as 
1 = female or 0 = male. 
                                                                                                                                                        
had been employed. The reason is that Amazon’s Mechanical Turk allows requesters to review work and reject 
unsatisfactory responses, which in turn affects survey takers’ ratings and thus their ability to participate in future 
surveys. Hence there are incentives for survey takers on Mechanical Turk to complete them faithfully, which 
increases the number of usable responses (Berinsky et al., 2012). In contrast, survey companies rely on one-time 
participants and have no way of penalizing survey takers who produce unusable responses; the result is a higher 
rate of exclusion. 
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Moderator variable. The moderator variable was Perceived procedural justice, 
measured via seven items adapted from Colquitt and Rodell (2011). The items consisted of 
the following statements. (i) I felt able to express my views during the recruitment process; 
(ii) I was able to influence the decisions arrived at by the recruitment process; (iii) the 
recruitment procedures were applied consistently; (iv) the recruitment procedures were free 
of bias. (v) The recruitment procedures were based on accurate information; (vi) I was able to 
appeal the decisions arrived at by the recruitment process; (vii) the recruitment process 
upheld ethical and moral standards. Respondents rated their agreement with these statements 
on a scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), α = 0.85.7 
Controls. We controlled for respondents’ demographic characteristics: age, marital 
status (1 = married, 0 = not married), log of household income, and ethnicity (1 = white, 0 = 
not white). We also controlled for respondents’ managerial status with three dummy variables 
(one each for upper, middle, and lower management) while using “no managerial 
responsibilities” as the omitted category. In addition, we controlled for aspects of 
respondents’ recent job search that may have affected the salience of the rejection they wrote 
about; these aspects include the number of months since the rejection occurred, how rejected 
the respondent felt (1 = not at all, …, 5 = very rejected), and the number of rejections 
experienced while on the job market. Since men’s and women’s career aspirations may differ 
(Litzky and Greenhaus, 2007), we also controlled for career orientation (Warr, et al., 1979). 
An example item is “My career is an important part of my identity”; this statement was rated 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), α = 0.81. 
Finally, to control for perceived distributive justice we used the following four items, which 
                                                 
7 We conducted an exploratory factor analysis that yielded one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1. All 
items loaded onto the scale with a value of greater than .56. We dropped two questions that loaded onto the 
scale with a value of less than .7, recalculated the scale, and then estimated the same ordered logit model 
described in the main analysis. The results remained unchanged in terms of both the direction and magnitude of 
effects, so we used the full scale in the analysis. 
26 
were also adapted from Colquitt and Rodell (2011): (i) the outcome reflected the effort I put 
into the recruitment process; (ii) the outcome was appropriate for the work I completed 
during the recruitment process; (iii) the outcome reflected what I contributed to the 
recruitment process; and (iv) the outcome was justified, given my performance (α = 0.94). 
Results 
Individuals’ responses to rejection in executive recruitment. We started by performing an 
exploratory analysis of the qualitative data provided by individual respondents; in this 
endeavor our aim was to assess whether, as implied by our theory, individuals mentioned fair 
treatment when explaining their willingness to consider another role with an employer who 
had rejected them in the past. Two independent coders analyzed participants’ written 
responses about the recruitment experience and the reasons for their willingness (or not) to 
apply for another role with the rejecting organization about which they had written.8  
Nearly 30% of the respondents mentioned issues of fit as a key consideration driving 
either a willingness or an unwillingness to apply again (e.g., “I think this company would be 
a good fit for me” versus “It would only be worth my consideration if the role was a good 
fit”). Opportunities for development (“It would offer a challenge as well as future growth”) or 
lack thereof (“I think they do not offer much advancement in jobs”) were also mentioned by 
about 18% of respondents (of which some were willing and others unwilling to apply again). 
Being worse-off (“Unless they offered me a significant pay increase, I doubt I would apply”) 
or better-off (“I am trying to up my income”) in terms of remuneration was mentioned by 
14% of respondents. Individuals who expressed a high willingness to apply focused on their 
                                                 
8 For each respondent, the raters coded whether their written response mentioned one of ten categories of 
reasons for their willingness to apply again (1 = mentioned as a reason, 0 = not mentioned as a reason). The ten 
categories were developed by one of the authors based on a search of the literature on applicant reactions. The 
raters achieved moderate to perfect inter-rater reliability across the ten categories (average Κ = .83). In cases of 
disagreement, a third, independent rater categorized the response for the category under disagreement – the 
response was scored as a 1 if two of the three raters thought the category was represented in the written response 
and a 0 if two of the three raters thought the category was not represented in the written response. 
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admiration for the organization that rejected them and for the profession in general 
(approximately 18% of all candidates): “I was very impressed by the company and would still 
be interested in working for them”. All those who indicated they would not be willing to 
apply to the previously rejecting employer (i.e., the 26 respondents who selected either 1 or 2 
on the willingness scale) identified unfair treatment or unfair decision making as the issues 
that explained their unwillingness. Respondents frequently cited unfair treatment – that is, a 
lack of procedural justice – in their justification, as in this example: “After two interviews, 
one in person and one in a conference call, I was informed that I would receive a package in 
several weeks; however, the several weeks kept growing and growing in time and I never 
received an offer.” Many respondents also felt that the decision not to hire them was itself 
unfair and so exhibited a lack of distributive justice: “I was told that I was over-qualified and 
should showcase my talent elsewhere. I explained that I no longer wanted the executive suite 
and wanted to use my other talents in other areas of IT. I felt discriminated against because 
although I had the experience and was well qualified and the best candidate, I was older and 
‘over-qualified’.” Often candidates mentioned issues both of procedural and distributive 
justice in their responses: “[I] had to call them to find out that I was not selected. I found out 
that the job was offered to the chairman’s son-in-law and [that] interviewing was done just … 
[to] show that they were considering other candidates.” 
The qualitative data indicates that our respondents readily articulated the role that 
perceived unfair treatment played in their unwillingness to engage with an employer who had 
rejected them previously, thereby underscoring the relevance of this mechanism.  
[[ INSERT Table 5 about Here ]] 
Hypotheses tests. Table 5 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations. There 
were no statistically significant gender differences on age, income, marital status or ethnicity, 
however female respondents had fewer years of work experience and were more likely to 
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report being in upper management. Women also reported higher feelings of rejection than 
men (3.5 versus 2.9). We test our hypotheses using ordered logit models because the outcome 
variable (Willingness to apply again) is categorical and ordinal (Long and Freese, 2006).9 In 
Table 6, Model 1 includes the control variables. Models 2 and 3 also include the predictor 
variables (Female candidate and Perceived procedural justice), whose interaction is entered 
as a separate term in Model 4.  
[[ INSERT Table 6 about Here ]] 
Recall that, according to Hypothesis 1 (and as found in Study 1), women should be 
less willing than men to consider a job opportunity from a prospective employer that had 
previously rejected them. In Study 2 all respondents have previously been rejected, hence 
testing Hypothesis 1 translates into a negative effect of the Female candidate indicator on 
Willingness to apply again. Model 2 in Table 6 indicates that this coefficient is negative (β = 
−.899), p = .0546. The Female candidate effect is also negative once we introduce the 
Perceived procedural justice indicator (β = −.956, p = .045). A likelihood ratio test indicates 
that including this variable significantly improves the fit of the model (p = .003).  
Although the small size of the sample limits the statistical power of these regressions, 
the size of the Female candidate effect is substantial. We calculated the predicted 
probabilities of each response level of the dependent variable for men versus women. Using 
the coefficients from Model 2 and holding all control variables at their means we find that 
men’s predicted probability of responding “definitely will not apply” or “probably will not 
apply” is 14%, as compared to 28.6% for women. This amounts to nearly double the 
probability of women being more likely to refuse re-applying after a rejection. Conversely, 
the predicted probability of men’s responding “probably will apply” or “definitely will apply” 
                                                 
9 Our results are substantially the same if we instead use linear regressions. However, the Akaike test reveals 
that the ordered logit model is preferable to the OLS model. 
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is 69.3%, as compared to 47.9% for women. The magnitude of these effects is similar if using 
the coefficients from Model 3. Furthermore, the Female candidate effect is independent of 
women’s stronger feelings of rejection. That is, although women in this sample felt 
subjectively more rejected than men after the rejection event, their willingness to apply again 
to the employer is not affected by these feelings.10 This is consistent with our theory, which 
focuses on perceptions of procedural justice rather than on affective reactions to being 
rejected.  
Hypothesis 2 suggested that perceptions of fair treatment are more strongly linked to 
women’s than to men’s willingness to consider future job opportunities at a previously 
rejecting firm. This claim is supported by a positive and statistically significant interaction 
effect between Perceived procedural justice and the Female candidate indicator (Model 4 in 
Table 6). When all other variables in the model are held constant, the coefficient for that 
interaction effect reveals an increase of 1.229 in the log odds of women reporting greater 
willingness to apply (than do men) as their perceived level of procedural justice increases. 
Figure 1 plots the interaction effect in terms of predicted probabilities. It depicts how 
the likelihood of men’s and women’s responses falling within each category of the outcome 
variable varies with perceived procedural justice, holding all control variables at their means. 
The most striking patterns appear in Panels A and E– that is, at both extremes of the outcome 
variable. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that, to the extent women reported being treated unfairly 
in the recruitment process, they were much more likely to state that they “definitely would 
                                                 
10 Although the bivariate correlation between Feelings of rejection and Willingness to apply again is not 
significant, the Feelings of rejection coefficient is positive and statistically significant once we introduce the 
Female candidate indicator in Model 2. Even though feelings are not the focus of our theory, intuitively we 
would expect that feelings of rejection would be associated with a lower willingness to reapply. We do not have 
a ready theoretical interpretation for why this is not so here. In separate analyses we explored the empirical 
significance of this result, by assessing the robustness of the Feelings of rejection coefficient to different 
specifications of the statistical model – i.e. using separate logits models and OLS regressions rather than ordered 
logit models. We found it to lose statistical significance in both cases, thus we hesitate to draw strong 
conclusions from this control variable.   
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not” apply again in the future. Women at the lowest end of the perceived procedural justice 
distribution have an 85% predicted probability of answering that they “definitely would not” 
apply, as compared to 0% for women who perceived the process as being very fair. In 
contrast, men’s perceived procedural justice was much less related to the likelihood of their 
re-applying (13% versus 2.5% of “definitely will not” for the lowest versus the highest levels 
of perceived procedural justice). This pattern of results can be compared with the results, 
plotted in Panel E of the figure, for individuals who said they “definitely would” apply again 
to the previously rejecting employer. Here, to the extent women reported being treated fairly 
in the recruitment process, they were much more likely to state that they “definitely would” 
apply again in the future. As before, men’s perceived procedural justice was much less 
related to the likelihood of their re-applying. Overall, these results support our hypothesis that 
perceptions of fair treatment more strongly affect women’s than men’s decisions to apply 
again for a position with an employer that has previously rejected them. 
[[ INSERT Figure 1 about Here ]] 
We performed several robustness checks on the results reported in Table 6. First, we 
ensured that the interaction effect is not driven by gender differences in the distribution of 
Perceived procedural justice. In particular, we confirmed that the variance in perceived 
procedural justice responses is not statistically different for men versus women. Second, we 
ensured that perceptions of outcome fairness – that is, of distributive rather than procedural 
justice – are not a driver of the results. Toward that end, we re-estimated the ordered logit 
regression analysis while using perceived distributive justice as the moderating variable. The 
Female candidate × Perceived distributive justice interaction term was not statistically 
significant (β = .23, p = .52), which suggests that in this sample there is no evidence that 
women respond differently from men to perceptions that the decision to reject was itself 
unfair. If both interaction terms are entered in the model, only the Female candidate × 
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Perceived procedural justice is statistically significant. Third, we confirmed that men and 
women in this sample do not differ in their reported history of job rejections – neither over 
their whole career (r = −.15, p = .13) nor during their most recent job search (r = .17, p = 
.10).  
In addition to these robustness checks, we examined a number of alternative 
explanations for our findings. We investigated whether gender differences in responses to 
rejection in this sample are a “calculative” response by checking for whether women 
estimated that they would be less likely than men to succeed if they did re-apply. For this 
purpose we asked respondents to estimate how likely they would be to succeed in attaining 
the role if they applied again, with responses ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). 
We found no correlation between gender and estimation of future success (r = −.07, p = .5). 
Including these responses as a control variable likewise had no effect on the magnitude or 
direction of our results. We also explored whether gender differences in relational-
interdependent self-construal (Cross, et al., 2000), regulatory focus (Neubert, et al., 2008), or 
gender-based rejection sensitivity (London, et al., 2012) might affect our findings. Table 7 
summarizes the results of separate ordered logit regression analyses that included these 
variables as controls. In each analysis, including the additional control variable did not 
substantially change the direction or magnitude of the interaction effect between Perceived 
procedural justice and Female candidate. 
[[ INSERT Table 7 about Here ]] 
Discussion of Study 2 
Study 2 extends the results of Study 1 by examining Hypothesis 1 in a diverse sample 
of executive men and women and thereby showing that, across industries and occupations, 
women were less likely than men to consider a job opportunity from a prospective employer 
that previously rejected them. This study also provides support for the greater-weighting 
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effect (Hypothesis 2). We found that women’s responses to rejection do depend, to a greater 
extent than men’s, on their perceptions of being treated fairly (or unfairly) in the recruitment 
process. Indeed, the responses of those who expressed different levels of willingness to 
consider a role with a previously rejecting employer indicate that among individuals who 
were very unwilling, women (but not men) reported that they had been treated very unfairly 
whereas among individuals who were very willing, women (but not men) reported that they 
had been treated very fairly.    
 
STUDY 3: EXPERIMENT 
The main purpose of this study was to test Hypothesis 3, which proposes that recruitment 
rejection triggers belonging uncertainty in executive domains for women (but not for men), 
negatively affecting women’s perceptions of procedural justice and their subsequent 
willingness to pursue future opportunities with the rejecting firm. At the core of this 
confirmation effect is that men and women may react differently to the same rejection event. 
That is, men and women interpret the same reality differently because women have had 
different experiences as members of a negatively-stereotyped group in the executive domain. 
An accurate test of this mechanism therefore requires exposing individuals to an objectively 
identical rejection event and examining men’s and women’s subsequent reactions to that 
event.11 This is only feasible in a controlled experimental setting, as in the field no individual 
has the same recruitment experience, thus gender differences in how perceptions of fair 
treatment are formed could be due to women actually being treated differently.  
                                                 
11 Notice that Hypothesis 2 does not require this condition, as the greater-weighting effect is about gender 
differences in behavioral reactions to perceptions of procedural justice, regardless of how those perceptions are 
formed. It is possible that women’s perceptions of fair treatment differ from men’s for various reasons, 
including women being treated differently. This is not consequential when testing the strength of reactions to 
those perceptions (Hypothesis 2), but it is crucial when testing how perceptions are formed (Hypothesis 3).  
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Participants and Design 
We paid a survey company to recruit 160 executives to participate in our experiment. We 
recruited individuals who were currently employed in senior roles and who thus had a 
“baseline” sense of belonging in executive domains – rather than relying on a typical sample 
of university students, or an online panel (e.g., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk).  
We excluded individuals who submitted nonsense or gibberish for the writing task 
that constituted our manipulation, yielding a final sample of 128 individuals.12 The 
participants were 65 men and 63 women employed in either executive or senior management 
roles (by “senior management” we refer to individuals who report directly to top 
management). The majority (75%) of participants self-identified as white, 9% as African 
American, 9% as Hispanic, and 3% as East Asian; the remaining 4% did not identify their 
ethnicity. The average age of participants was 39.88 years (SD = 11.39). We used a between-
participants design while manipulating rejection (i.e., rejected versus accepted). 
Procedure 
Participants first responded to a number of demographic questions, which included indicating 
their gender. 
Rejection manipulation. Next, we manipulated rejection for all participants by 
randomly assigning them to either the rejection condition (candidate was unsuccessful at 
securing a position) or the acceptance condition (candidate was successful at securing a 
position). Following similar manipulations in previous research (Mazzocco, et al., 2012; 
Wang, et al., 2013), we told participants that they would receive a randomly chosen 
applicant’s record for a candidate who had applied for an executive role and would then write 
a first-person account of “a day in the life” of that person. Participants received exactly the 
                                                 
12 As noted in footnote 7, our exclusion rate is higher than if workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk had been 
employed because survey companies rely on one-time participants and have no way of penalizing survey takers 
who produce unusable responses.. 
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same candidate record – namely, the executive job applied for as well as candidate age and 
performance rating at each of four recruitment steps: résumé screening, interview with 
recruiter, interview with head of HR, and interview with CEO. We matched participants’ 
gender with the applicant record they received, so men wrote about a male candidate 
(Michael Barrett) and women wrote about a female candidate (Michelle Barrett). 
The application outcome noted on the candidate record varied depending on the 
rejection condition. In the Rejected condition, the outcome of the application was noted as 
“reject in favor of another candidate”; in the Accepted condition, the outcome of the 
application was noted as “make offer”. 
Mediators. After completing the narrative essay writing task, each participant was 
asked to “put yourself in the shoes” of the candidate about whom they had written and to 
indicate their perceptions of procedural justice. We used the same Perceived procedural 
justice scale as employed in Study 2 (α = .89, M = 2.96 SD = .76). Participants also 
completed a 30-item “executive sense of belonging” questionnaire that we adapted from 
Good, et al. (2012; see Appendix A for items and Confirmatory Factor Analysis); for this 
task, α = .96. Participants rated their agreement with each item on a Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree). We reversed the scores to obtain a measure of belonging 
uncertainty in executive domains (M = 2.21 SD = .98). The correlation between the perceived 
procedural justice scale and the executive sense of belonging scale was r = -.50, (p < .0001).  
Dependent variable. Finally, participants were asked to take the perspective of that 
same candidate and consider being approached by the company about another executive-level 
position; they were then asked to indicate their likelihood of applying for this position (1 = 
definitely would not to 5 = definitely would). We used the same question as in Study 2. 
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Results 
Manipulation check. To check our manipulation, we asked participants to indicate 
how rejected they felt, given the outcome of their application. A t-test confirmed that those 
who wrote a story from the unsuccessful candidate’s perspective felt more rejected than those 
who wrote from the successful candidate’s perspective (t(126) = −10.53, p < .0001). 
Test of Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 suggests that recruitment rejection triggers 
belonging uncertainty in women, negatively affecting their perceptions of procedural justice 
and in turn, their willingness to consider future job opportunities from a firm that has rejected 
them in the past. In contrast, we expect that belonging uncertainty will not mediate the link 
between rejection, perceived procedural justice and willingness to consider future job 
opportunities for men. This hypothesis corresponds to a moderated-mediation model 
(presented in Figure 2), according to which gender differences in willingness to apply again 
are affected by the intervening variables of Belonging uncertainty and Perceived procedural 
justice. Following common practice to test moderated-mediation, we both examine the joint 
model for men and women (Figure 2a) and also perform a more conservative “separate 
groups” analysis to confirm that the proposed theoretical path is different for men and women 
(Figure 2b) (Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1989).  
We examined the model outlined in Figure 2a using the Process macro in SPSS 
(model 6; Hayes, 2008) (results are presented in Table 8a). The first step examines each of 
the relationships between the variables in the mediation path via a series of regressions (a, b 
and c in Figure 2a). First, we regressed Belonging uncertainty on Rejection × Female 
candidate, with Rejection and Female candidate being added as controls (Model 1, Table 8a). 
The Rejection × Female candidate coefficient indicates that rejected women report an 
increase of .65 points in the belonging uncertainty scale (B = .65, p = .059). This increase 
corresponds to approximately 29% of the average belonging uncertainty reported by 
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participants in this sample. In contrast, the increase in belonging uncertainty for rejected men 
is essentially 0 (B = .06, p = .77)  Next, we regressed Perceived procedural justice on 
Belonging uncertainty, controlling for Rejection, Female candidate and Rejection × Female 
candidate (Model 2, Table 8a). Consistent with our theory, individuals who felt more 
belonging uncertainty in the executive community perceived lower levels of procedural 
justice (B = -.35, p < .0001). In the third step we regressed Willingness to apply again on 
Perceived procedural justice, controlling for Rejection, Female candidate, Rejection × 
Female candidate and Belonging uncertainty (Model 3, Table 8a).13 As expected, individuals 
who thought they had been treated fairly were more likely to apply again in the future (B = 
.55, p < .0001). 
Having established each of the relationships between the variables in the mediation 
path, the next step in testing the moderated-mediation model involves examining whether the 
indirect effect of Rejection × Female candidate via Belonging uncertainty and Perceived 
procedural justice on Willingness to apply again  was significantly different from zero (i.e. 
testing the significance of a*b*c in Figure 2a). A bootstrap sample of 5, 000 replications 
(Preacher and Hayes, 2008) indicated that zero fell outside the 95% confidence interval 
(which ranged from −0.33 to −0.008) providing support for our hypothesized model in the 
joint analysis of men and women.  
                                                 
13 Unexpectedly, the Rejection x Female candidate on Willingness to apply again (d in Figure 2b) was not 
significant, B = -.14, p = .63. This does not affect the validity of our theoretical model for the confirmation 
effect, since theoretically and statistically meaningful mediation can occur in the absence of a significant total 
effect (MacKinnon, et al., 2000; Hayes, 2008; Zhao, et al., 2010; Rucker, et al., 2011). Nevertheless, an earlier 
experiment provided causal support for Hypothesis 1. Using the same method described previously, but 
excluding the measures of the mediating variables we recruited 206 managers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(106 men and 100 women, 82% white, 37.77 years old (SD = 9.62), 15.46 years of work experience (SD = 9.49). 
The interaction between Rejection x Female candidate on Willingness to apply again was sizeable and 
statistically significant, B = -.45, p = .03. In line with Hypothesis 1, women who were rejected were less willing 
to apply for another job with the firm (M = 3.95 SE = .11) than women who wrote from the perspective of a 
successful candidate (M = 4.52 SE = .10), B = -.56, p = .0002. In contrast, men’s willingness to apply to future 
job opportunities was unaffected by whether they wrote from the perspective of a rejected (M = 4.11 SE = .10) 
or successful (M = 4.22 SE = .10) candidate, B = -.11, p = .43.  
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The significant indirect effect found in the moderated-mediation analysis for the full 
sample implies that the variables that underlie responses to rejection in executive recruitment 
differ for men and women. However, in order to fully test that this is the case, we also 
conducted the most conservative test possible of Hypothesis 3, namely a “separate groups 
analysis” (see Figure 2b). We used the same procedure described above (again using model 
6; Hayes, 2008). Table 8b presents the results. For women, rejection was positively related to 
belonging uncertainty in the executive community (B = .71, p = .009, 95% BCa CI −1.24 to 
−0.19).14 To the extent women perceived that they did not belong in the executive 
community, they tended to perceive lower procedural justice in the recruitment process (B = 
−.32, p < .0001). Perceived procedural justice was, in turn, positively related to Willingness 
to apply again for a subsequent role with the employer: to the extent women felt that they had 
been treated fairly, they were more willing to apply again in the future (B = .51, p < .001). 
We tested the indirect effect (i.e., via belonging uncertainty and perceived procedural justice 
of rejection on willingness to apply again in another bootstrap sample of 5,000 (af*bf*cf in 
Figure 2b). In this analysis, zero fell outside the 95% confidence interval (which ranged from 
−0.36 to −0.02). This result indicates support for the hypothesized confirmation effect: for 
women, rejection triggers belonging uncertainty, priming them to perceive less fair treatment 
which in turn makes them unwilling to apply again to a previously rejecting firm. 
We then checked for evidence of the confirmation effect in men’s responses to 
rejection. We found that, in contrast to the results for women, rejection was not significantly 
related to men’s sense of belonging in the executive community (B = .06, p = .78; here the 
95% BCa confidence interval ranged from −.51 to 0.37). Also, using  5,000 bootstrap 
replications, we found that zero fell inside the 95% confidence interval (which ranged from 
                                                 
14 Responses to the Belonging uncertainty measures were not normally distributed. We therefore followed 
Field’s (2009) recommendation and included the bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals for 
the analysis of the Rejection to Belonging uncertainty link since these tests are robust to deviations from 
normality. 
38 
−0.13 to 0.08) for the indirect effect – via belonging uncertainty and perceived procedural 
justice – of rejection on willingness to apply again for men (am*bm*cm in Figure 2b). This 
result indicates that, for men, belonging uncertainty does not mediate the link between 
rejection and willingness to apply again in the future. Indeed, when belonging uncertainty is 
excluded from the analysis (Table 8b),  perceived procedural justice fully accounts for men’s 
responses to executive recruitment rejection: for men, zero fell outside the 95% confidence 
interval for the indirect effect between Rejection, Perceived procedural Justice and 
Willingness to apply again (-.80 to -.17). Thus, men who are rejected perceive less procedural 
justice than men who are successful (B = -.71, p < .0001), and to the extent that men perceive 
less procedural justice, they are less likely to apply again in the future (and vice versa, B = 
.61, p < .000l).15  
Alternative conceptual model. In separate analyses we tested whether the alternative 
moderated-mediation model (i.e., Rejection x Female candidate  Perceived Procedural 
Justice  Belonging Uncertainty  Willingness to apply again) was a good fit for our data, 
by switching the order of the mediators and re-conducting the analysis described above. The 
results indicate that the indirect effect (i.e., via Perceived procedural Justice and Belonging 
Uncertainty) of Rejection × Female candidate on Willingness to apply again using 5,000 
bootstrap replications, zero fell inside the 95% confidence interval (which ranged from −0.04 
to .07) indicating that this alternative model did not explain gender differences in responses 
to rejection in recruitment.  
Alternative explanations. We tested several other theoretical explanations for our 
results. We confirmed that perceptions of distributive justice do not account for our findings 
                                                 
15  We confirmed this via a statistical comparison of the indirect effect via procedural justice to the indirect 
effects (1) via belonging uncertainty and (2) via belonging uncertainty  perceived procedural justice. In both 
cases 5000 bootstrap replications indicated that the indirect effect via procedural justice was significantly 
different from (1) via belonging uncertainty (95%CI .13 to .81) and (2) via belonging uncertainty  perceived 
procedural justice (95%CI .12 to .80), confirming that men’s responses to rejection in terms of their willingness 
to apply to a subsequent role do not depend on belonging uncertainty.  
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by examining the indirect effect of Rejection, via Belonging uncertainty and Perceived 
distributive justice, on Willingness to apply again separately for men and women. The 
indirect effect was not significant for men (CI from −0.04 to 0.07) or women (CI from −0.08 
to 0.01). We also ruled out two other “belonging” concerns as explanations for our results by 
re-running our analyses with two single-item measures of belonging as controls (Nichols and 
Webster, 2013): one for the need to belong generally and one for the sense of belonging in 
the fictional company. The subsequent analyses replicated the results already reported for our 
main analyses. We conclude that, even when we account for women’s general need to belong 
and for specific concerns about belonging in a particular organization, doubts about 
belonging in executive domains evidently underlie gender differences in responses to 
rejection in executive recruitment. 
Discussion of Study 3  
Study 3 tested the confirmation effect in an experiment using real executives as participants. 
The results suggest that rejection triggers belonging uncertainty in women, negatively 
affecting their perceptions of procedural justice and the likelihood that they will put 
themselves forward for a subsequent role with the rejecting employer. Men’s sense of 
belonging in executive realms, in contrast, is unaffected by rejection. It is notable that we 
found support for this effect in a sample of participants who were already working in senior 
roles and hence ostensibly did belong in executive realms.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Using a combination of field, survey, and experimental data this paper examines gender 
differences in responses to recruitment rejections, so to better understand women’s choices to 
compete for senior executive roles. We argue that labor market rejection shapes individuals’ 
experiences of fairness and belonging in non-gender-neutral ways. In particular, women are 
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less likely than men to put themselves forward for another role with a prospective employer 
that has rejected them in the past. This difference is associated both with women’s stronger 
reactions to unfair treatment after experiencing a rejection (the greater-weighting effect) as 
well as with women perceiving more unfair treatment as rejection triggers their belonging 
uncertainty in the executive domain (the confirmation effect). The three studies build on and 
complement each other, allowing us not only to establish the real-world validity of our theory 
but also to illustrate its associated psychological mechanisms. 
This work’s first contribution is to propose gender differences in responses to 
recruitment rejections as a novel explanation for women’s under-representation at the top of 
the corporate ladder. Although rejection is widespread in the labor market, we know little 
about how it shapes career trajectories over time. Our paper establishes that recruitment 
rejections affect candidates’ decisions to compete for future jobs – and that they do so 
differently for men and women. This finding has both theoretical and empirical implications. 
From a theoretical standpoint, it contributes to studies of gender inequality in career 
trajectories, which have identified differences in the jobs occupied by men and women as a 
key driver of career outcomes (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Ridgeway, 2011). We argue that 
the jobs individuals do not take may matter as much for these outcomes as the jobs they do 
take. Hence theories of gender differences in career trajectories would benefit from better 
understanding the consequences of recruitment interactions that did not result in placement. 
From an empirical standpoint, there may be far-reaching consequences of rejection for 
gender inequality at the top of the labor market. Women can only be hired for senior roles if 
they are part of the candidate pool; therefore, any mechanism that shapes the gender 
composition of that pool also shapes female representation among the hired executives 
(Rubineau and Fernandez, 2013). Women’s lesser willingness to be considered after a 
rejection is one such mechanism, which operates by reducing the number of women available 
41 
to be considered during each selection process. The nature of executive careers is such that 
most senior managers have likely been considered and rejected during many internal and 
external recruitment processes. Given the sequential nature of these selection processes, even 
small initial differences in willingness to be considered for jobs could eventually cause large 
differences in the composition of candidate pools. That is: if a greater proportion of women 
than of men decline to be considered post-rejection, then the number of women available for 
subsequent selection rounds will gradually but continuously decline – as will the number of 
women hired for senior roles.16 This dynamic is consistent with sociological models of 
cumulative disadvantage (DiPrete and Eirich, 2006), which establish that group differences at 
an early stage of a process are amplified when the outcomes of each stage shape the next 
stage’s initial conditions. 
The second contribution of this study is to provide a link between theories of gender 
inequality in executive labor markets that are based on the supply side (workers’ behavior) 
and those based on the demand side (employers’ behavior). There is evidence that the 
decisions of individuals and firms both affect women’s under-representation in top 
management (Reskin and Roos, 1990; Haveman and Beresford, 2012), yet most scholars 
studying each of these aspects have treated them as being independent. In particular, existing 
accounts of women’s career choices either take women’s preferences as intrinsic or situate 
them exclusively in gendered socialization experiences outside the labor market (Bertrand, 
                                                 
16 To illustrate this process, in separate analyses we built a stylized formal model by simplifying the recruitment 
process so that it has only two stages: interview and hire. In order to “assume away” demand-side hiring 
decisions, all candidates willing to be considered are interviewed; one (random) candidate is hired and the others 
are rejected. Hired individuals do not return to the candidate pool in subsequent periods. Rejected individuals 
are unwilling to be considered again with probability pf  (for women) or with probability pm (for men), and those 
who are not willing to be considered never return to the pool. The rejected candidates who are willing to be 
considered again (with probability 1 − pf  for women or 1 −  pm  for men) are included in the next period’s 
candidate pool. We then examine how the candidate pool’s proportion of women changes over time due only to 
the difference in willingness to be reconsidered after being rejected; for this purpose we use probabilities 
inferred from the results of Model 2 in Table 4. We find that the percentage of female candidates drops quickly 
after only a few rounds of selection, which confirms that gender differences in this context are amplified over 
time. 
42 
2011). Socialization is undoubtedly important, with cultural messages about which types of 
jobs are appropriate for women being likely to shape women’s general sense of belonging in 
the executive domain. Our theory extends these accounts to highlight the role of situational 
factors, such as direct and vicarious experiences with negative stereotypes and unequal 
treatment, in shaping women’s sense of belonging in executive domains (with consequences 
for their willingness to compete for top corporate jobs). By thus linking women’s sense of 
belonging to their behavior and perceptions in recruitment interactions, we provide a more 
complete theoretical understanding of gender differences in career preferences and behavior. 
Furthermore, by highlighting that such preferences do not arise out of inherent gender 
differences but rather from the experience of being an outsider, our theoretical model is 
broadly applicable to any negatively-stereotyped individual in executive domains (i.e., other 
‘outsiders’).  
A third theoretical contribution of our research is to the literature on procedural 
justice. The effect of perceived procedural justice on candidate reactions has been extensively 
studied in the selection and recruitment literature (for a review, see: Ryan and Ployhart, 
2000). However, recent work has shifted away from examining the external, objective factors 
that affect individuals’ judgements of procedural justice toward investigating the internal, 
psychological processes that underlie fairness judgements (Brockner, et al., 2015). We 
contribute to this nascent literature a person-in-situation account of the links among rejection, 
perceptions of procedural justice, and candidate reactions in recruitment settings. More 
specifically, our theory proposes belonging uncertainty as a previously unexamined 
psychological mechanism that can shape gender differences both in reactions to procedural 
justice as well as in perceptions of procedural justice. The latter effect, borne out by our 
experimental results, has implications for theories of justice, as it suggests that women’s 
threatened sense of belonging may lead them to perceive the same objective situation as more 
43 
unfair – with consequences for their future engagement with potential employers. Men’s 
sense of belonging, in contrast, was not affected by being rejected and did not mediate the 
link between rejection and future willingness to apply. In other words, even in a setting where 
women and men underwent the same selection process, they experienced it differently. An 
important implication of these findings is that current theoretical models of procedural justice 
may better account for some groups’ experiences more than others’.  
The theoretical contributions just described have significant organizational and policy 
implications. In particular, they underscore the sometimes unintended consequences – for 
diversity outcomes – of how firms manage their recruitment processes and candidate 
rejections. Given that women cannot be hired for executive roles unless they are willing to be 
considered for those roles, practices that increase women’s willingness to put themselves 
forward for executive positions should contribute to increased representation of women in 
these executive realms. This outcome is crucial in light of renewed efforts within policy 
circles to increase the proportion of women in top management jobs (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2010; 2020 Women on Boards, 2014). Previous work has 
highlighted the importance of providing rejected candidates with appropriate feedback to help 
them make sense of the rejection (Fernandez-Mateo and Coh 2015). Our research further 
implies that this is particularly relevant for candidates whose sense of belonging may be 
threatened by recruitment rejections.  In the case of women, this is important because there is 
evidence that they may actually receive different types of feedback from men’s – e.g. 
comments about their personality or style rather than skills and abilities (Correll, et al., 2016) 
Hence interventions that formalize feedback-giving in selection processes may be helpful. To 
address the more general issue of belonging uncertainty in executive domains, practices that 
normalize the experience of belonging uncertainty (Walton and Cohen, 2007; Stephens, et al., 
2014) or affirm the self following rejection (Cohen, et al., 2006) may be effective. However, 
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it is noteworthy that the literature on belonging uncertainty does suggest that gender-blind 
interventions (e.g., messages about the importance of diversity and lack of discrimination in 
hiring practices) may have the unintended negative consequence of increasing women’s 
belonging uncertainty (Cohen and Garcia, 2008). More work is thus needed to examine how 
different organizational interventions can reduce the tendency of women to “lean out” after 
experiencing recruitment rejections. 
Our paper opens up several directions for future research. First, we studied gender 
differences in responses to rejection in the context of external recruitment. Although we 
expect that our theory applies also to internal selection processes, the extent to which it 
does – and how that extent might vary across organizations – remains an open question. For 
example, structuralist perspectives (e.g., Kanter, 1977) suggest that gender differences in 
organizational behavior are attenuated in “strong” contexts, such as organizations that feature 
clear career development trajectories. This possibility indicates that women’s responses to 
rejection may be more similar to men’s when the recruitment process minimizes ambiguous 
and/or insider-based practices. Hence a fruitful question for future research is assessing the 
extent to which the mechanism identified in this paper affects women’s progress regarding 
executive roles in a variety of organizational contexts. 
Second, it is worth reiterating that our field data pertains to interactions between 
candidates and an executive search firm and not to direct interactions between individuals 
and employers. This setup is useful because it allows us to measure past interactions in ways 
that would otherwise be extremely difficult to employ. Moreover, the characteristics of 
executive search processes are such that relationships between recruiters and candidates are 
crucial at the earliest stages of the hiring process. Our obtaining of similar results in Studies 2 
and 3 (when we present respondents with direct employer interactions) suggests that our field 
results are not driven by the mediated nature of the specialized hiring process we examine. 
45 
That being said, future research would do well to examine just how the observed mechanisms 
differ as a function of the particular recruitment context. 
Third, we have examined gender differences in how being rejected by a company 
shapes individuals’ future willingness to interact with the same company. This is the most 
parsimonious expression of our theory, and it allows for the cleanest empirical tests. 
Nevertheless, one might reasonably suppose that women’s reactions to past rejections shape 
their willingness to be considered for jobs not only with previously rejecting firms but also 
with other similar firms, or even for jobs in a similar function or industry to that of the 
rejecting firm. Such behavior should be expected if, for instance, a female candidate 
interprets rejection from a given firm as a broader signal of lack of belonging in similar 
positions. Furthermore, responses to rejections in the job search process could more generally 
work as a mechanism contributing to job segregation in the labor market as a whole.17 Given 
that job segregation is a crucial contributor to wage inequality and differences in career 
advancement by gender (Reskin, 1993; Petersen and Saporta, 2004), our study hence opens 
up new avenues for broader research on labor market inequality.  
In conclusion, our research demonstrates that gender differences in responses to 
rejection may well contribute to the under-representation of women at the upper echelons of 
organizations. The theoretical model that we propose to explain these gender differences 
conceptualizes women’s preferences to compete for senior roles as being shaped by their 
previous recruitment experiences. We remark that such preferences may be independent of a 
woman’s actual probability of success in a given selection process. Beyond these theoretical 
implications, our findings also suggest that popular recommendations advising that women 
“lean in” to executive leadership may miss the mark by treating women’s choices as being 
largely or even solely determined by forward-looking calculations based on the expected 
                                                 
17 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.  
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value of actions, or “the shadow of the future” (Poppo, et al., 2008). In contrast, our work 
calls attention to the “shadow of the past” – here, women’s past experiences with gender 
inequality – as a determinant of their decision to ‘lean out’. 
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Table 1. Summary of Data and Measures used in each Study  
Study Rejection measure Willingness to apply again  
measure 
Study 1: Longitudinal archival 
data from Executive search firm 
N = 10,292 individuals (23,555 
observations)  
 
 
Past rejection at any stage 
Rejected in the past by 
search firm or potential 
employer  
Candidate declines to 
interview with search firm  
Study 2: Survey of executives 
N = 99 individuals 
Past rejection at any stage 
after initial application 
Rejected in the past by 
potential employer 
Candidate’s willingness to 
apply for a subsequent role 
with the employer 
Study 3: Experiment using 
executive participants  
N = 128 individuals 
Past rejection at end of 
selection process 
Rejected in the past by 
potential employer 
Candidate’s willingness to 
apply for a subsequent role 
with the employer 
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Table 2. Study 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Individual and relationships variables a 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD 
Candidate declined to interview  23,555 0 1 0.217 0.412 
Female candidate 23,555 0 1 0.162 0.368 
Candidate was previously rejected b  23,555 0 1 0.454 0.498 
Candidate declined past opportunity 23,555 0 1 0.290 0.454 
Candidate was previously placed by Execo 23,555 0 1 0.034 0.182 
Candidate jobs considered by Execo 23,555 0 18 1.555 1.798 
Candidate contacts in other roles 23,555 0 107 3.692 7.556 
Candidate answered advertisement 23,555 0 1 0.224 0.417 
Job characteristics b 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD 
Job salary (GBP) 950 50,000 1,250,000 159,212.2 94,645.33 
Prior search firm–client relationship 950 0 19 1.413 2.561 
Number of candidates considered 950 1 512 66.634 54.352 
Job was advertised 950 0 1 0.355 0.479 
Job industry (%)  Job function (%) 
Media 3.78 Infrastructure 6.52  
Financial  
 services 9.78 
Marketing  
 director 7.05 
IT 7.68 Government 9.26  Consultant 1.47 Sales director 3.36 
Pharmaceutical 7.68 Health 0.63  Board member 4.52 Divisional sales   director 2.23 
Agriculture 0.10 Education 0.21  CFO 6.94 Legal and   governance 4.84 
Finance 33.36 NGO 1.26  Divisional fi-  nance director 3.26 
Nonexecutive  
 director 1.36 
Professions 8.31 Other 3.89  CEO 7.78 Pharmaceutical   scientist 1.15 
Leisure 6.00    
Divisional  
 managing  
 director 
13.68 
Other  
 management  
 position 
21.47 
Engineering & 
 manufacturing 12.52    
Operations  
 director 2.73 Other 15.13 
Retail 15.47     Government 3.89 Missing 0.03 
Energy 2.21     HR director 4.63   
a Calculated at the “candidate by job” unit of analysis (N = 23,555). 
b Calculated at the “job vacancy” level of analysis (N = 950). A given vacancy may correspond to more than one 
industry and to more than one job function; hence the sum of percentages exceeds 100. 
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Table 3. Study 1: Correlations between Main Variables (N = 23,355) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Candidate declined to interview             
2 Female candidate .07           
3 Candidate was previously rejected –.03 –.03          
4 Candidate declined past opportunity .13 .06 .08         
5 Candidate was previously placed by Execo –.004 –.01 .06 .06        
6 Candidate jobs considered by Execo .03 .01 .53 .49 .21       
7 Candidate contacts in other roles .08 .05 .15 .28 .23 .35      
8 Candidate answered advertisement –.27 –.10 .03 –.22 –.01 –.06 –.17     
9 Job salary .02 –.04 .014 .11 .03 .07 .22 –.23    
10 Prior search firm–client relationship .01 .05 .08 .04 –.01 .06 –.02 –.04 .01   
11 Number of candidates considered –.09 .001 –.03 –.08 –.02 –.07 –.06 .22 –.16 .05  
12 Job was advertised –.08 –.003 –.01 –.13 –.01 –.05 –.10 .52 –.33 –.04 .32 
Notes: Space considerations prevent us from including in this table the 18 job function dummies, 16 industry dummies, and year controls. A complete correlations table that 
incorporates the entire set of control variables is available from the authors upon request. All correlations greater than .015 are significant at p < .05. 
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Table 4. Study 1: Linear Probability Model of the Effect of Gender and Past Rejection on the 
Probability of Candidate Declining to Interview 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
Candidate declined past opportunity –.458 *** –.459 *** –.432 *** 
 (.013) (.013) (.013)    
Candidate previously placed by Execo .079 .079 .095    
 (.051) (.050) (.061)    
Candidate jobs considered by Execo .005 .004 .005    
 (.004) (.004) (.004)    
Candidate contacts in other roles .003 + .003 + .003    
 (.002) (.002) (.002)    
Candidate answered advertisement –.159 *** –.160 *** –.144 *** 
 (.010) (.010) (.012)    
Job salary (GBP thousands, logged) –.070 *** –.069 ***                 
 (.013) (.013)                 
Number of candidates considered (logged) –.014 ** –.014 **                 
 (.005) (.005)                 
Prior search firm–client relationship –.002 –.002 +                 
 (.001) (.001)                 
Job was advertised .036 *** .037 ***                 
 (.010) (.010)                 
Candidate was previously rejected .158 *** .146 *** .146 *** 
 (.008) (.008) (.009)    
Candidate was previously rejected  .077 *** .062 *** 
 × Female candidate  (.017) (.018)    
Constant .635 *** .633 *** .010    
 (.072) (.072) (.115)    
Candidate fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Job fixed effects No No Yes 
N 23,555 23,555 23,555    
R2 (within) 0.19 0.19 0.29    
Notes: All tests are two-tailed; robust standard errors (clustered by candidate) are reported in parentheses. All 
models include the following controls: year, job function, and industry.  
+p < .10, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 5. Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (N = 99) 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Willingness to apply again  3.42 1.31                
2 Age 45.35 10.08 –.03               
3 Married 0.80 0.40 –.01 .21              
4 Income (log) 5.39 0.28 .10 –.07 –.01             
5 White 0.71 0.46 –.08 .24 .23 –.02            
6 Feelings of rejection 3.29 1.21 .01 .05 .10 –.22 .18           
7 Career orientation 4.02 0.72 .24 –.12 –.06 .07 –.08 .02          
8 Upper management 0.28 0.45 –.07 –.12 .09 .14 .06 –.12 –.09         
9 Middle management 0.22 0.42 –.03 .08 .15 –.13 .08 –.05 –.03 –.34        
10 Lower management 0.13 0.34 .03 –.10 –.25 .04 –.28 .13 .05 –.24 –.21       
11 Years work experience 21.87 10.50 –.08 .84 .22 –.06 .28 –.02 –.14 –.14 .01 –.15      
12 Months since rejection 8.48 7.46 –.13 .12 .21 –.09 .23 .04 –.23 .07 .00 –.22 .13     
13 Number of rejections 0.48 0.40 .11 –.30 –.04 .23 .06 –.15 .08 .12 –.11 –.21 –.29 .15    
14 Perceived distributive justice 2.73 1.16 .35 –.09 .12 .19 –.23 –.38 .15 .03 .00 –.05 –.03 –.17 .23   
15 Female candidate 0.53 0.50 –.08 –.19 –.13 .12 –.12 .28 .21 .28 –.22 –.05 –.24 –.06 .18 .01  
16 Perceived procedural justice 3.38 0.84 .38 –.17 .01 .22 –.18 –.28 .05 –.02 .00 .11 –.17 –.20 .22 .63 –.01 
Note: All correlations greater than .20 are significant at p < .05. 
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Table 6. Study 2: Effects of Gender and Perceived procedural Justice on Willingness to Apply 
Again after Being Rejected (ordered logit models) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    Model 4              
Age .047 .050 .052 .057    
 (.035) (.035) (.036) (.036)    
Married –.341 –.496 –.673 –.610    
 (.527) (.537) (.544) (.543)    
Income (logged) .481 .677 .522 .206    
 (.731) (.744) (.753) (.773)    
White –.022 –.170 –.291 –.120    
 (.466) (.472) (.491) (.492)    
Feelings of rejection .275 .445 * .567 ** .476 * 
 (.179) (.202) (.214) (.220)    
Career orientation .399 .460 + .631 * .559 * 
 (.270) (.274) (.277) (.281)    
Upper management –.705 –.488 –.442 –.508    
 (.498) (.515) (.517) (.526)    
Middle management –.595 –.660 –.661 –.740    
 (.553) (.554) (.552) (.561)    
Lower management –.676 –.887 –1.118 –1.067    
 (.689) (.693) (.716) (.693)    
Years of experience –.051 –.059+ –.056 –.052    
 (.034) (.035) (.036) (.036)    
Months since rejection –.013 –.015 –.001 –.002    
 (.029) (.028) (.029) (.029)    
Number of rejections –.124 .061 –.053 –.116    
 (.543) (.547) (.552) (.554)    
Perceived distributive justice .645 ** .680 *** .358 .320    
 (.204) (.206) (.231) (.234)    
Female candidate  –.899 + –.956 * –4.938 ** 
  (.468) (.477) (1.781)    
Perceived procedural justice   .927 ** .423    
   (.318) (.377)    
Perceived procedural justice    1.229 * 
 × Female candidate    (.530)    
N 99 99 99 99    
Log likelihood –140.73 –138.85 –134.45 –131.64              
Chi-square 22.98 * 26.75 * 35.55 **  41.18 *** 
Notes: All tests are two-tailed; standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 7. Study 2: Robustness Checks 
  Regression coefficients 
Construct Measures Control construct 
Perceived  
procedural justice  
 × Female candidate 
Estimation of future success Single item                     .49 
                   (.26) 
           1.28 
            (.52) 
* 
 
Relational-interdependent 
self-construal  
RISC scale 
(Cross, et al., 2000) 
                    .10 
                   (.29) 
           1.27 
            (.54) 
* 
 
Regulatory focus Promotion–prevention 
focus 
(Neubert, et al., 2008) 
Prevention   .14 
                   (.22) 
Promotion   .14 
                    (.24) 
           1.15 
            (.53) 
* 
 
Gender-based rejection 
sensitivity 
GBRS scale modified 
for work context 
(London, et al., 2012) 
                  –.09 
                   (.08) 
           1.21 
            (.53) 
* 
 
*p < .05 
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Table 8. Study 3 Regression Results 
 
Table 8a: Moderated Mediation Results (N = 128).  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Belonging uncertainty Perceived procedural 
justice 
Willingness to apply 
again 
Rejected Condition .06 
(.24) 
-.69 
(.15) 
*** .04 
(.17) 
Female Candidate -.25 
(.24) 
-.15 
(.15) 
.12 
(.17) 
Rejected Condition x 
Female Candidate 
.65 
(.34) 
+ .30 
(.22) 
-.09 
(.24) 
Belonging Uncertainty  -.35 
(.06) 
*** -.14 
(.07) 
* 
Perceived Procedural 
justice 
  .55 
(.09) 
*** 
R .26 * .61 *** .61 *** 
R2 .07 .37 .37 
    
Table 8b. Separate Groups Analysis  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Belonging uncertainty Perceived procedural 
justice 
Willingness to apply 
again 
Female (N = 63)    
Rejected condition .71 
(.26) 
** -.41 
(.17) 
* .003 
(.18) 
** 
Belonging uncertainty  -.32 
(.08) 
*** -.25 
(.08) 
Perceived procedural 
justice 
  .51 
(.13) 
*** 
Male (N = 65) 
 
   
Rejected condition .06 
(.22) 
-.69 
(.14) 
*** .08 
(.20) 
Belonging uncertainty  -.38 
(.09) 
*** .001 
(.11) 
Perceived procedural 
justice 
  .61 
(.15) 
*** 
Male (N = 65) 
(excluding Belonging 
uncertainty) 
   
Rejected condition  -.71 
(.17) 
*** .08 
(.19) 
Perceived procedural 
justice 
  .61 
(.13) 
*** 
Notes: All tests are two-tailed; standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Figure 1. Study 2: Effect of Candidate Gender and Perceived Procedural Justice on Willingness 
to Apply Again to a Prospective Employer after a Rejection 
 
Panel A: Probability of responding “Definitely will not apply” 
 
 
 
Panel B: Probability of responding “Probably will not apply” 
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Panel C: Probability of responding “Don’t know” 
 
 
 
Panel D: Probability of responding “Probably will apply” 
 
 
  
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
1 2 3 4 5
Perceived procedural justice
man woman
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
1 2 3 4 5
Perceived procedural justice
man woman
 67 
Panel E: Probability of responding “Definitely will apply” 
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Figure 2. Study 3: Theorized & Estimated Model  
 
 
 
2a. Moderated-Mediation Analysis 
 
 
 
 
2b. Separate Groups Analysis 
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Appendix A: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Executive Sense of Belonging Scale 
 
We adapted our Executive Sense of Belonging measure from the Sense of Belonging 
in to Math Scale developed for use in a student population by Good, et al. (2012). In order to 
ensure that the factor structure of the original measure was valid in a managerial population 
we conducted a factor analysis. Because the factor structure of the measure has already been 
established in prior research, we conducted a Confirmatory Factor Analysis rather than an 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (which would be appropriate if we had developed a new 
measure).  
We recruited 453 managers (247 men 206 women) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
The average age of the respondents was 33.59 years (SD = 9.59) and they had an average of 
5.52 years (SD = 5.76) of experience in management. The managers responded to the 
Executive Sense of Belonging scale and provided some demographic information.  
 We conducted the CFA in MPlus. We tested the second order factor structure of the 
original measure, in which Sense of Belonging was indicated by five first order factors 
(Membership, Acceptance, Affect, Desire to Fade, and Trust), which were in turn indicated 
by their individual items. The results, presented in Table 1A, indicated that each individual 
item achieved high factor loadings on to the relevant first-order factor (all factor loadings  > 
.64), and each first order factor achieved moderate to high-factor loadings on to the second 
order factor, sense of belonging (all factor loadings > .56).  
We examined several measures of model fit against conventional cut off levels (Hu 
and Bentler, 1999; Kenny, 2015). The chi-square test indicates the similarity between the 
observed and expected matrices, with probabilities of greater than .05 indicating that these 
matrices are similar. However, in large samples (N > 200) the chi-square statistic is almost 
always statistically significant. Given this, it is not surprising that the chi-square value of 
2088.62 was significant at p < .001 in our sample of 453 managers. As an alternative, we 
examined the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), which measures the difference between the 
observed and the null model. The CFI was .86 (values over > .8 indicate acceptable model 
fit). Finally, we examined the standard root mean square residual (SRMR), which is an 
absolute measure of fit that represents the difference between the observed correlation and 
the predicted correlation. Values below .08 indicate acceptable model fit – in this case, the 
SRMR was .07. Overall then, based on the factor loadings and model fit indices, we 
concluded that that adapted executive sense of belonging scale was valid for use in 
managerial populations.  
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Table 1A. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Executive Sense of Belonging  
 
Second-order factor 
loading 
First-order factor 
loading 
Item 
0.56       Membership  
 0.911 I feel that I belong to the executive community 
 0.922      I consider myself a member of the executive world 
 0.957      I feel like I am part of the executive community 
 0.895      I feel a connection with the executive community 
   
0.946     Acceptance  
  0.776 I feel like I fit in 
 -0.752 I feel like an outsider (-) 
 0.767 I feel respected 
 0.814 I feel valued 
 0.796 I feel accepted 
 0.792 I feel appreciated 
 -0.849 I feel disregarded (-) 
 -0.854 I feel neglected (-) 
 -0.855 I feel excluded (-) 
 -0.785 I feel insignificant (-) 
   
0.89    Affect  
 0.773     I feel at ease 
 0.822    I feel comfortable 
 0.711       I feel content 
 0.768       I feel calm 
 -0.778       I feel anxious (-) 
 -0.819     I feel tense (-) 
 -0.795       I feel nervous (-) 
 -0.794       I feel inadequate (-) 
   
0.744    Fade  
 0.641       I enjoy being an active participant 
 -0.767       I wish I were invisible (-) 
 -0.913       I wish I could fade into the background and not be 
noticed (-) 
 -0.801      I try to say as little as possible (-) 
   
0.685     Trust  
 0.724       I trust the recruitment and selection procedures to be 
unbiased. 
 0.648       I have trust that I do not have to constantly prove myself 
 0.897   I trust my mentors to be committed to helping me 
develop 
 0.779       Even when I do poorly, I trust my mentors to have faith 
in my potential 
Note. Model fit indices are as follows: χ2(400, N 453) 2088.86, p < .0001; CFI .86; standard 
root mean square residual .07. All ps < .001. Parenthetical minus signs indicate that the items 
were reverse-coded.  
 
